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THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AS A PUBLIC FORUM: THE
INCOHERENCE OF PARTIES AS FREE SPEECH
ASSOCIATIONS AND A PROPOSED CORRECTION
Wayne Batchis*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing the associational rights of
political parties is both highly consequential and deeply inconsistent. It dates back
at least as far as the Court’s White Primary decisions more than a half-century
ago. In recent decades, the Court has imposed an arguably ad hoc formula,
striking down regulations on political parties on First Amendment grounds in
some cases, while upholding them in others. From a jurisprudential perspective,
critics might point to insufficiently principled distinctions between these cases.
From a normative perspective, the very expansion of First Amendment rights to
political parties, like the parallel extension to corporations in Citizens United, is
ripe for scrutiny. It relies on a questionable underlying premise: political parties,
as entities, should be entitled to constitutional rights comparable to those afforded
to individuals. As a consequence, this Article argues entities the Framers would
have viewed as dangerous factions are empowered, and individuals—the literal
targets of the First Amendment’s protection—are disempowered. This Article offers
and explores a doctrinal alternative as a corrective: the American political party
system should be treated as a limited public forum, subject to the Court’s wellestablished public forum doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Categories matter in First Amendment jurisprudence. The freedom of speech and its derivative rights 1 work as a remarkably powerful immunity from ordinary law. Cabining and defining this immunity categorically serve to promote clarity and certainty that
First Amendment freedoms will be there as a reliable shield even
when deeply unpopular, and these refinements also provide the
flexibility to give sufficient weight to non-expressive interests when
appropriate. Categories can refer to discrete kinds of content
deemed to receive less than full First Amendment protections,
such as true threats, child pornography, and libel. Categories are
also used to differentiate kinds of speakers—a government employee versus a private employee, an individual human being versus an associational entity comprising multiple human beings, the
government versus a private corporation. Finally, categories are
used to distinguish various platforms for expression, whether differentiating a public forum, such as a public park, versus a private
forum, such as the inside of a private home, or a privately-owned
public place, such as a shopping mall versus a limited public forum
controlled by government that serves a narrow constituency, such
as a system for registering and funding student organizations at a
public university. All of these First Amendment categories have
critical constitutional implications. Yet, no category is hermetically
sealed. Categories are powerful First Amendment tools, but they
are often blurry on the edges. And when categories overlap with
one another, when case law pertaining to a specific First Amendment category is underdeveloped, when an inappropriate category
is used, or when an appropriate categorization regime is ignored,
courts may be forced to rely on ad hoc balancing rather than consistent rules for resolving cases. While perhaps reasonable for the
case at hand, such ad hoc decision making risks muddying the waters and degrading the overarching system of principled categorization.
* J.D., Ph.D.; Professor, University of Delaware, Department of Political Science and
International Relations.
1. This Article focuses primarily on the derivative right of freedom of association, but
other rights derived from the free speech clause—though not textually guaranteed—might
be said to include symbolic expression, financial expenditures or contributions utilized for
expression, and litigation, among others. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (freedom of association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(freedom of association); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (symbolic expression);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (financial expenditures); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (litigation).
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This Article argues that political parties have yet to find a suitable categorical home—and that such a home may be found in the
limited public forum. Supreme Court decisions addressing political parties have failed to settle on a coherent approach. In some
2
contexts, parties have been treated as creatures of government,
3
and in others as almost entirely private. At one time, the Court focused primarily on the equal protection implications of differential
regulatory treatment of parties, but later it shifted its focus to a
4
First Amendment analysis. Over time, the Court has seemed to settle into the idea that political parties should be treated as expres5
sive associations for First Amendment purposes. But this approach
has garnered significant criticism and has had inconsistent and re6
grettable consequences. It is a doctrinal choice that has put courts
in a role that they are not equipped to fulfill: parsing the merits of
particular structural regulations governing the American electoral
process and weighing these merits against the ostensible “associational” interests of the party.
By design, the Framers left us vast choice when it comes to determining optimal electoral procedure. There are no easy answers.
Policy choices over the fine-grained details of electoral procedure
remain deeply contested by political scientists and theorists and are
arguably not appropriate for judicial resolution. States may experiment with different approaches: open or closed primaries, fusion
or single party candidates, caucus or primary. For every choice,
there are consequences. I will not assert that such choices should
be immune to the Constitution, only that the Court’s choice to
categorize political parties as expressive associations was the wrong
way to go about constitutionalizing political parties. In this Article,
I propose an alternative First Amendment approach. The American political party system should be understood as a limited public
forum. Public forum doctrine provides a better framework for constitutionalizing the political party system. Viewing the system as a
public forum acknowledges the extent to which parties are inextri-

2. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); see also Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 481–84 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating that primary elections could be subjected to the amendments to the Constitution as “part of the state’s electoral machinery”).
3. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
4. JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 467 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1993).
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cably integrated into the American system of representative government, while at the same time respecting the crucial traditional
role they play in disseminating and facilitating vigorous free
speech.
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence that addresses the associational rights of political parties is consequential,
deeply inconsistent, and, to a wide range of scholars and jurists,
7
troublingly flawed. It dates back at least as far as the Court’s White
Primary decisions more than a half-century ago, which refused to
respect the autonomy of racially exclusionary political parties in
8
the American South. The cases were widely celebrated as a critical
step in the civil rights struggle of African Americans. Less acknowledged was their questionable underlying premise: that political
parties, as entities, should be entitled to constitutional rights comparable to those afforded to individuals. The holdings purported
to represent a simple concession, that associational constitutional
rights must sometimes yield to other conflicting constitutional
commands—here, equality—because for some purposes, a private
9
political party takes on the role of a governmental actor. Over
time, case-by-case challenges exposed fundamental tensions between individual rights and associational rights, and between private party speech and government speech.
In recent decades, the Court has had many opportunities to im10
pose its concededly ad hoc formula for affording First Amendment rights to political parties, striking down regulations on parties in some cases, while upholding them in others. From a
jurisprudential perspective, critics might point to insufficiently
principled distinctions between many of these cases; to highlight
just one example, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
11
independents from voting in major party primaries, but later upheld a law prohibiting major party members from voting in third7. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, It’s My Party and I’ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties,
Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 92–99
(2013); Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
95 (2002); Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 775–77 (2000); Lowenstein, supra note
6, at 1741–42.
8. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9. Terry, 345 U.S. at 481–84 (Clark, J., concurring); Smith, 321 U.S. at 663 (Black, J.,
plurality).
10. The Court has repeatedly explained that there is no “litmus-paper test” in this area
of constitutional law. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359
(1997) (“No bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms.”).
11. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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party primaries. 12 And from a normative perspective, there is much
more to question than alleged inconsistency. The very expansion
of First Amendment rights to political parties, like the parallel extension to corporations in Citizens United, is ripe for scrutiny. The
result of this jurisprudence has been an electoral system that, while
intended by the Framers to be guided by the states, is stymied by
case law affording constitutional primacy to political parties. As a
consequence, this Article argues, entities that the Framers would
have viewed as dangerous factions are empowered, and individuals—the literal targets of the First Amendment’s protection—are
disempowered. However, there are many reasons to doubt that political parties fit within this paradigm, even if one accepts the
premise that associations should be treated as individuals for First
Amendment purposes, which is a relevant principle in many areas
of First Amendment jurisprudence. In a two-party system, political
parties are simply not analogous to organizations such as the Boy
Scouts, the Jaycees, or Citizens United, which are associations that
have triggered the Court’s expressive association analysis. Indeed,
this Article argues that viewing them as such is inconsistent with
another emerging First Amendment principle: the government
speech doctrine.
The American party system is a hybrid. As an essentially public
institution serving America’s democratic process, the government
should have ample room to regulate and structure the party system
to serve the general welfare, as well as to ensure that representative
democracy works and works well. At the same time, it would ignore
reality to deny that political parties have a significant private component that is analogous, in some respects, to the private individuals who fill public parks and utilize them for their own nongovernment-affiliated speech. Governmental regulatory power over
parties thus must also face significant First Amendment boundaries—limits that would not apply if political parties were characterized as purely governmental entities. A doctrinal middle ground, in
other words, is needed. The public forum doctrine, as this Article
shows, strikes just such a balance. Although this doctrine may have
begun as a narrow instrument addressing a small subset of government-controlled geographic spaces, the concept of the limited
public forum has evolved to encompass a broad range of expressive
venues. These include intangible venues—such as a system of regis-

12.

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
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tered student organizations at a state university 13—that are strikingly analogous to the American two-party system. The limited public
forum framework is an excellent fit for the hybrid nature of the political party system.
This Article begins by briefly considering why we have the political party system that we do in America. Next, it examines the history of the Supreme Court’s evolving political party jurisprudence,
which is followed by an analysis and critique of two possible doctrinal roads the Court might have, and in some cases did, traverse—
the notion that when parties speak it is, in fact, the government
speaking, and, in contrast, the view that political parties should be
treated as private, rights-bearing associational entities largely independent of the state. This Article then introduces and defends a
new middle-ground paradigm: the American political party system
should instead be understood as a public forum for First Amendment purposes. This is followed by an exploration of how political
parties might fit within the existing public forum doctrinal framework. The Article concludes that the political party system should
be categorized as a limited public forum.
I. WHY POLITICAL PARTIES
America’s Framers established a framework for a republican system of government in which ideally wise representatives would be
chosen—often indirectly—by the people. Famously, however, they
left out many of the details. Political parties are not mentioned in
the Constitution, and there is, in fact, much evidence that the
14
Framers held them in low esteem. To America’s Founding Fathers, parties were vehicles for self-interest that inhibited the pro15
motion of the common good. George Washington, in his 1796
Farewell Address, spoke of the “baneful effects of the spirit of party,” emphasizing that the
“spirit of party . . . enfeeble[s] public administration . . . agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false
alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another;
foments occasional riot and insurrection[; and] opens the

13.
14.

See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680–85 (2010).
L. SANDY MAISEL & MARK D. BREWER, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 9, 22 (Niels Aaboe et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
15. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 450–51.
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door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the chan16
nels of party passion.”
Even with the early success of the Jeffersonian-Republican Party in
beating back the Federalists, both Jefferson and Madison hoped
that eventually their own party’s influence would dissipate, “restor17
ing the nonpartisan character of the Constitution.” Nevertheless,
Madison viewed political parties as “unavoidable evils in a free so18
ciety, forces to be condemned, yet patiently endured.”
Today, Americans take the two-party system for granted. However, suppose we momentarily forget those attributes of the political
process that have emerged and evolved over more than two centuries since the ratification of the United States Constitution. With
the Framers’ minimal blueprint in mind, what choices might we
make? How should we fill in the unanswered details? How should
we go about choosing representatives? With staggering diversity, a
vast range of interests and perspectives, and perhaps most troublingly, a tendency by much of the population to be only superficially engaged in the policy debates and personal assessments in19
volved in making such choices, answering these questions might
appear daunting.
Suppose we choose a political party system as the primary method of organizing this overwhelming task. Considering the challenge, this may make intuitive sense. Admittedly, a system in which
two dominant and fiercely competitive teams take a central role—
consolidating ideology, personality and organization—may prove
imperfect. However, there is much to be said for such a system.
The parties provide heuristics to voters, an important and practical
20
shortcut for deciding which candidates to support. With only two
major parties, there is bound to be quite a lot of diversity within
each party; at the same time, they are also likely to be broadly dis21
tinguishable on ideological grounds. Thus the implications of a
candidate’s party affiliation become comprehensible to even the
16. George Washington, President of the United States, Farewell Address to the People
of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796) in S. DOC. NO. 106-21, at 16–17 (2000).
17. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT:
REMAKING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22 (Michael Nelson ed., 1999).
18. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 451.
19. CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS 9-12 (2017).
20. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow
the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
331, 349–50 (1997).
21. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 459–60.
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relatively disengaged citizen. Parties provide a centralized organizational structure to represent and advocate for this massive amalgamation of ideas, positions, and personalities. The parties help
voters narrow down the list of candidates from which they choose.
This function helps ensure that the set of choices voters confront is
not too long and that voters do not simply disengage from the
democratic process because it is intolerably overwhelming. At the
same time, in representing such a broad swath of the population,
political parties must remain responsive to the world around them.
According to Professor Richard Hasen, “as an encompassing coalition, [a party] is able to accommodate a large number of diverse
groups and viewpoints, giving each group a stake in the outcome
22
of the election.” They are stable, yet flexible and changeable.
Thus, if we were to accept the principle that a two-party system
would be an effective way to structure a representative democracy,
the next natural question is: How would this work? How are parties
to function? To what extent should they be incorporated into the
very operations of government, including in presidential elections,
in Congress, and in America’s vast bureaucracy? How are they to
choose their standard bearers? How are they to be structured to
best achieve their ends—which, ultimately, are the ends of our
democracy itself—of a vital government that is sustainable, efficient, reflective of the people it represents yet sufficiently respectful of their diversity, and perpetually open to debate, reinvention,
discovery, and improvement.
The reality of political parties is, or course, not hypothetical. We
have lived with a system in which two political parties are an integral part—if not the integral part—of America’s democratic process
23
for more than 150 years. Yet, we still have trouble identifying just
what political parties are. Political parties are confounding. They
affect the government, are the government, and are controlled by the
government, and all of these attributes are true in different ways
and, to a varying extent, at different times. Political scientists have
long agreed that political parties are in fact best understood not as
one thing at all, but at least three things: an organization made up
of activists and leaders, a group of elected and appointed officials
22. Hasen, supra note 20, at 347.
23. Scholars generally trace the emergence of the modern two-party system to the Jacksonian era of the 1830s. See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 17, at 22–34. To explain the continued
durability of the two-party system in the United States, political scientists point to the prevalence of winner-take-all representation. This may be contrasted with the proportional representation that results in multiparty systems in many other parts of the world. See GARDNER &
CHARLES, supra note 4, at 31.
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who form parts of the government and act under the party banner,
24
and individual citizens and voters who affiliate with the party. Parties are fluid and rigid, combative and conciliatory, diverse but unified. They are ubiquitous, yet hard to know. In short, it can be difficult to wrap one’s head around the nature of the political party.
It thus may be tempting to simplify the American political party,
to seek to boil it down to its essence. And one might imagine this
essence to be a simple group of people who band together to have
their voices heard and advocate for a particular set of policies for
the greater (or self-serving) good. With this conception in mind, it
might make intuitive sense to afford such groups the negative
rights—the freedoms from government interference—provided to
individuals by the Constitution. But this definition, while appealing
in its simplicity, will not do. This is not to say that it does not have
its proponents. However, the institutional enormity, organizational
complexity, and multiplicity of roles that the two parties play in
American society make such a reductive definition profoundly unsatisfying or, at best, staggeringly insufficient. Furthermore, under
this conceptualization, the questions above about how we should
structure a two-party system potentially become moot, because they
are not our (meaning our government’s) questions to answer.
Thus, on one hand, a romanticized vision of political parties may
emphasize their private nature, portraying them as civic-minded
organizations made up of average Americans simply seeking to
have a political voice. On the other hand, the two-party system is
quite reasonably understood as an essential building block of our
electoral and democratic structure, one that should be selfconsciously utilized, designed, and redesigned to make American
democracy work as well as it can. In many respects, these conceptualizations are in direct tension with one another.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO POLITICAL PARTIES
The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to determine how
political parties should be treated from a constitutional perspective, but it initially took the position that they were private entities
beyond the control of the federal government. In the 1921 case
Newberry v. United States, a Senate candidate seeking his party’s

24. MARJORIE RANDON HERSHEY, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 8 (Eric Stano et al. eds.,
14th ed. 2011); see also GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 459.
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nomination had exceeded the amount of primary campaign
25
spending allowed under federal law. Article I, Section 4 of the
Constitution gives the federal government authority to “make or
alter such [r]egulations” with regard to the “[t]imes, [p]laces and
26
[m]anner of holding [e]lections” for members of Congress.
However, when confronted with the question in Newberry of whether such power extends to the regulation of party primaries, the Su27
preme Court said it did not. One might characterize Justice
McReynolds’s opinion as a simple exercise in originalism. Since
political party primaries were “unknown” at the time the original
constitutional was drafted, McReynolds reasoned that the power to
regulate primaries should not be understood to be part of the gov28
ernment’s power. He then went on to adopt the conception of
party behavior that recalls the simple (or arguably simplistic) model discussed above, describing party primaries as “merely methods
by which party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend
29
to offer and support.” Parties, in other words, are just voluntary
organizations, and primaries are events in which those people, of
their own free will, simply get together and choose someone to
best represent and act upon their views. Allowing the government
to interfere with the internal processes of private political parties
30
would “infringe upon liberties reserved to the people.” Despite
the crucial role political parties play in Article I, Section 4 elections, the majority in Newberry chose formalism over realism: “If it
be practically true that under present conditions a designated party candidate is necessary for an election—a preliminary thereto—
nevertheless his selection is in no real sense part of the manner of
31
holding the election.” After all, the Court reasoned, “[m]any
32
things are prerequisites to elections.”
The Court itself was not unified in its reasoning. In concurrence, Justice Pitney sharply questioned the logic of excluding
primaries from the government’s constitutional power to regulate
elections when they have “no reason for existence, no function to
perform, except as a preparation for the [general election]; and
the latter has been found by experience in many States impossible

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 244–46 (1921).
U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1.
Newberry, 256 U.S. at 233–34.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 257.
Id.
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of orderly and successful accomplishment without the former.” 33
Pitney questioned, “[w]hy should ‘the manner of holding elections’ be so narrowly construed? An election is the choosing of a
person by vote to fill a public office. In the nature of things it is a
complex process, involving some examination of the qualifications
34
of those from whom the choice is to be made.” In other words,
there was reason to doubt the durability of the Court’s extremely
formalistic perspective. We might note that this was the same Court
that would repeatedly deny the federal government regulatory authority through the Commerce Clause under the rationale that
manufacturing and mining may result in commerce but are not
35
themselves commerce. The Newberry Court drew on the logic of
this now-discredited line of cases as analogous support for rejecting
regulatory authority over political party primaries. 36 As with the
Court’s restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it would not
take long for the Court’s perspective to change. But, unfortunately,
as this Article demonstrates, change would not mean clarity on the
constitutional status of political parties.
In United States v. Classic, the Court did away with the formalistic
rule in Newberry and concluded that the federal government’s criminal laws may be used to ensure that voters in primary elections
have their votes counted. Classic involved the illegal alteration and
falsification of ballots in a party primary, and, once again, the question was whether the power granted to regulate elections by Article
37
I, Section 4 of the Constitution extended to this issue. In this
1941 opinion, Justice Stone unequivocally rejected not merely the
formalism of Newberry, but its originalism as well. To Stone, it was
largely irrelevant that those drafting Section 4 did not contemplate
party primaries, “[f]or in setting up an enduring framework of
government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future
and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those
38
fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses.”
Stone pointed out the perverse implications of reading the Constitution to allow for the regulation of a general election, but not the

33. Id. at 282.
34. Id. at 279.
35. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
36. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 257 (“Without agriculture, manufacture, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to control of Congress.”).
37. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 307 (1941).
38. Id. at 316.
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primary leading up to that election, when the latter election simply
39
ratifies the decision of primary voters. Indeed, it is quite common
in areas of the country where a single party is dominant for a gen40
eral election to feel like, and effectively be, a mere formality. In
such jurisdictions, the winner of the dominant party primary is virtually guaranteed victory in the general election. In such a context,
denying Congress the authority to regulate a party primary is arguably tantamount to a wholesale denial of its Article I, Section 4
power, because the true electoral contest—the one that matters—is
the primary.
At this stage, the Court was contemplating the simple question
of whether the federal government’s constitutional power over
elections is broad enough to encompass party primaries. Concern
over party autonomy, in which the party itself is a rights-bearing actor, had not yet entered the picture. The Classic Court pointed out
that the party primaries at issue were conducted at state expense
and in accordance with state regulations dictating “the time, place
41
and manner” of the elections. The Court reasoned that, effectively, the state had simply turned what the Framers might have imagined as a one-step process (a general election) into one with two42
steps (a primary, followed by a general election). The party primary had thus become a part of “an election” within the meaning
of Article I, Section 4.
However, from this point, the complexities only grow. It is one
thing to conclude that the federal government has the power to
regulate a certain activity, which provides the baseline conclusion
that such activity is within the government’s ambit of power. The
next question is how the party and its activities are characterized
for other constitutional purposes. The intuitive understanding of a
political party may be that of a voluntary association of individuals
who seek to promote a particular set of interests or views. Classic
would suggest that even if this characterization is accurate, where
the primary process of that party becomes a part of the overall
election process, the federal government nonetheless has the power to regulate such party primaries. In itself, there is nothing especially controversial or surprising about the general proposition that
the government has the power to regulate private behavior. The

39. Id. at 319–20.
40. Increasing
Turnout
in
Determinative
Primaries,
PLURIBUS
PROJECT,
http://pluribusproject.org/representation/echelon-insights (last visited January 8, 2019).
41. Classic, 313 U.S. at 311.
42. Id. at 316–17.
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question in Classic might simply be understood as whether the federal government has the power to regulate this particular private
behavior.
It is also, however, private behavior that is intimately intertwined
with government behavior. Once upon a time, major parties may
have begun as largely voluntary associations, but the premise of
Stone’s majority opinion in Classic is that they now function as an
essential part—if not the essential part—of a state-run democratic
election. Not only might this justify governmental regulation of
party activity, but party activity might in some sense be said to become state activity. And when the state is the actor at issue, the rules
change. Regulation of the action may move from optional-statutory
to mandatory-constitutional. It might seem like quite a leap for
governmental regulation of political parties to move from impermissible, to permissible, to required, all on the basis of how one
characterizes that entity and its actions. However, this is the natural
consequence of two foundational aspects of the American constitutional system: the limited government principle of federalism and
the state action doctrine. As explained in Classic, to be merely permissible, a federal government regulation must be within the ambit
43
of the government’s constitutional power, and, as this Article
shall discuss, it may not be disallowed by negative constitutional
rights such as those found in the First Amendment. To be a required
regulation—in the case of a mandatory substantive constitutional
constraint—the party must be said to be engaging in state action.
As much as the principles embodied in the Constitution may reflect values that are aspirational for all of society, whether it be to
freely exchange ideas, respect certain aspects of individual privacy,
or ensure equal treatment, constitutional commands are generally
directed at only governmental actors. The Constitution, after all, is
strong medicine. The Constitution not only carved out rights or
guarantees thought to be important or valuable, but it was designed such that its meaning could not be changed without a supermajority through the amendment process or through a rare
shift in Court sentiment. This seemingly undemocratic choice was
justified by the need to place affirmative limits on a uniquely powerful institution, an institution unlike any other. The government,
as the Framers understood, monopolizes legitimate violence and
poses distinctive and dangerous risks of abuse. The state action
doctrine has thus long suggested that private actors and entities

43.

Id. at 320.
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are quite simply not subject to the rigid mandates that the Constitution imposes on the government. For undesirable behavior by
non-governmental actors, the use of statutory law offers a more
flexible remedy.
This was the issue in the White Primary Cases. Smith v. Allwright
was decided just three years after Classic. The Texas Democratic
Party invited only white Texans to participate in its primary elections. The Party argued that the Constitution did not speak to
the—albeit racist—associational choices of a private, voluntary organization. The Party could exclude those with whom it chose not
44
to associate. There was no question that if the state had injected
such exclusionary race-based distinctions directly into its election
laws, it would have been struck down as an unconstitutional state
45
action in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
Indeed, the Court did precisely this in the 1927 case Nixon v. Herndon, where the state of Texas explicitly stipulated that Black people
46
were ineligible to vote in Democratic primaries. Likewise, five
years later in Nixon v. Condon, when Texas returned with a revised
law giving the parties a general power to “prescribe the qualifications of its own members” and the Texas Democratic Party, in turn,
adopted its own resolution limiting primary participation to “white
47
democrats,” the Court struck down that law as unconstitutional.
Because the authority for the discriminatory voting policy “originat[ed] in the mandate of the law,” the lines between public and
private action were blurred; the Court once again saw state action
in the discriminatory policy, not the mere actions of an independ48
ent voluntary organization.
However, by the time the Court confronted Smith v. Allwright in
1944, it had seemed to have backtracked, or at a minimum, to have
declared that there were real limits to the principles emanating
from the cases that imputed state action to political parties. In
Grovey v. Townshend, a Black Texan was denied an absentee ballot
for a Democratic primary election on the basis of his race. The
Court declined to strike down the racist policy on constitutional
grounds, distinguishing the case from Condon by emphasizing that
here, the method of voting was decided at an independent party
44. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 657 (1944).
45. The Fifteenth Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
46. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
47. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
48. Id. at 84.
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convention rather than by an executive committee designated by
49
50
Texas law. In Smith, the Court overruled Grovey. Instead of following Grovey, it adopted a broad definition of state action, which
included a party’s decision to exclude members on the basis of
51
their race. The choice to discriminate may have been the party’s,
decided at a party convention, but the procedures for party prima52
ries were subject to an extensive architecture of state regulation.
The Smith Court reasoned that the “statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot
make the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of the state in so far as it determines the partici53
pants in a primary election.”
On its face, this logic appears quite unassailable. As the Court
points out, ruling otherwise would establish a very convenient
loophole for governments that seek to deprive individuals of fundamental constitutional guarantees: Simply cast one’s “electoral
process in a form which permits a private organization to practice
racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be
54
of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.” The challenge, however, is identifying the boundaries of this principle. To
be effective, government policy must be responsive to the world,
regardless of whether governmental actors have the goal of subverting or promoting constitutional goals such as equality. It is
quite natural for law to go beyond merely adapting to a changing
social reality and to incorporate changed reality into new laws to
effectuate its ends. Social institutions, such as political parties and
other interest groups, may arise organically and voluntarily, without involvement of the government. They may expand and develop
a life of their own. Government, however, responds. A changed social landscape necessitates greater governmental involvement if it is
to merely continue fulfilling the mission that it had prior to such
evolutions; in the case of the expanding and changing role of political parties, this means maintaining an optimal system of fair,
democratic, and representative elections. Granted, what is “optimal” is very much a matter of debate. However, it is clear that a
government that is required to be entirely passive because of the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54 (1935).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
Id. at 663–64.
See id. at 663.
Id.
Id. at 664.

452

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 52:2

“private” nature of political parties would grow troublingly impotent in fulfilling its basic constitutional responsibilities.
This principle reached what could perhaps be said to be its zenith almost a decade later in Terry v. Adams, when the Court struck
down on constitutional grounds the exclusionary practices of what
appeared to be a purely private organization. A whites-only organization that ran its own Democratic pre-primary elections was thoroughly independent of government regulation by design. In fact,
the Jaybird Association of Fort Bend County Texas denied that it
was a political party at all, insisting that it was a mere “self55
governing voluntary club.” With this intention to be distinct from
state action, it held its primary in May, before it would have qualified for regulation under Texas law and been required to allow
56
participation by all races. The informal but consistent impact of
this unofficial, association-controlled pre-primary process, which
was not state-sanctioned, was that the Jaybird Association-endorsed
candidate went on to claim victory in every Democratic primary for
57
countywide office for more than a half century. The Jaybirdendorsed candidates filed for the subsequent Democratic primary,
which they invariably won with complete independence; the fact
that they were the Jaybird endorsee was transmitted to the public
58
only through private means. As Justice Minton acerbically pointed
out in his dissent, the “record will be searched in vain for one iota
of state action sufficient to support an anemic inference that the
Jaybird Association is in any way associated with or forms a part of
or cooperates in any manner with the Democratic Party of the
59
County or State, or with the State.”
Minton, however, was a lonely voice. He was the only dissenter
on a Court that now rejected formalism in favor of a realistic
acknowledgement of how private action could be used to circumvent, co-opt, and effectively nullify state action, at least in the political party context. The Court reasoned that “[t]he Democratic
primary and the general election have become no more than the
perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made in
60
Jaybird elections from which Negroes have been excluded.” The
Jaybirds was a political party, even if it failed to identify itself as

55.
56.
57.
58.
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60.

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 485–86 (Minton, J., dissenting).
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one, and its primaries had “become an integral part, indeed the
61
only effective part, of the elective process.” As such, constitutional
principles applied to its actions. The broader implications of the
ruling for the status of political parties were potentially profound.
If an organization, which does everything within its power to appear to maintain its independence and avoid political party status,
is nonetheless branded a state actor, it would seem clear that the
Court’s test is one of function over form. Political parties are state
actors, and it is not because of the label, but because of their statelike function.
III. POLITICAL PARTIES AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH?
If political parties are to be treated as instrumentalities of the
state, the constitutional implications would not appear to be limited to negative restraints on party behavior flowing from the state
action doctrine. If a political party is effectively a governmental actor, then, in other important respects, the Constitution would not
apply. Specifically, the Constitution does not generally protect the
government from itself. So, while the government may not conduct
a search without probable cause, it may be as unreasonable as it
sees fit when it is searching its own property. Although it may not
have the power to deprive individuals of their right to keep and
bear arms, it may choose to dramatically reduce its own armaments. In other words, if political parties are government, government regulation cannot be said to infringe on their rights. In the
sphere of free expression, this has become known as the Government Speech Doctrine. The government may generally choose to
speak, not to speak, or to convey only select messages and not oth62
ers, without infringing on the First Amendment.
Admittedly, the government speech doctrine is a relatively new
one or, at least, newly articulated. Scholars have acknowledged that
it is a doctrine that “remains in transition,” one in which there is
63
still a significant lack of clarity. Nonetheless, in recent cases, the
Supreme Court has made significant strides toward intelligibility.
64
As Helen Norton explains, this solved a longstanding problem.
Lower courts simply did not have the doctrinal vocabulary to deal
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See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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with free speech claims challenging expressive choices by government. Surprisingly, it was not until the middle of the last decade
that the Court clearly acknowledged the seemingly commonsense
notion that “[n]ot only must the government speak if it is to gov65
ern, its speech is often quite valuable to the public.” In 2009, the
Supreme Court confronted a challenge by a relatively obscure religious group that sought to place a permanent monument in a public park. Although another monument of the Ten Commandments
had been previously accepted and installed by the city, the Court
was clear that the private group had no First Amendment claim to
66
require the city to accept the display. The Court reasoned that
the choice to install an expressive work of art in a city park is gov67
ernment speech. Succinctly asserting what has come to be known
as the government speech doctrine, Justice Alito explained that
“[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of pri68
vate speech; it does not regulate government speech.”
As discussed above, Smith and Terry suggest that political parties
are, at least in certain respects, to be treated as state actors due to
their government-like electoral functions. Thus, taking the logic of
these cases one step further, one might conclude that not only may
governmental bodies freely regulate political parties, they may do
so in a manner that, if imposed on private parties, would violate
the Constitution. But this cannot be right. Under this logic, Watergate would not have been a scandal at all. Search and seizure of
the Democratic National Headquarters by operatives of a Republican president would have merely evidenced the government
searching its own offices—if a crime at all, it would not have constituted a constitutional infringement. Why does this not sit well? Because, of course, while the political parties in America may in many
respects play roles that are integral to the functioning of the government, they are vehicles for competing visions of the social
good. They are in perpetual tension not only with each other, but
with their own members and potential supporters who seek to alter
or strengthen aspects of their official and unofficial platform. It
would be difficult to accept the notion that when one of the two
major political parties controls the government, the other major
party may also, at the same time, be considered “the government.”
It might be tantalizingly attractive for a Democratic president to
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 421.
Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 467.

WINTER 2019] The Political Party System as a Public Forum

455

sign an executive order demanding that the Republican National
Committee refrain from any expressive activity challenging the
wisdom of his administration’s policy objectives and calling this
choice not to speak “government speech.” However, this would
seem, for obvious reasons, profoundly antithetical to the robust
debate that is part and parcel of our democratic system. It is perhaps equally dubious—and alarming—to imagine a president censoring the expression of that segment of his own party that is critical of his choices.
Political scientists have long understood the inherent complexity
of political parties. They are many things at once: the party organization, including the “party leaders and the activists who work for
party causes and candidates;” the party in government, comprised
of those who hold office under the party banner; and the party in
69
the electorate, citizens who affiliate with the party. Should the
party organization, which might make rules that effectively deprive
individuals of their ability to participate in the democratic process,
receive the same constitutional status as a group of party-affiliated
citizens who come together to discuss and formulate their ideas, as
in the White Primaries? How about a party operative who is appointed to a government commission and must, by law, be a member of one or the other major political party? We need not only ask
whether the government may constitutionally regulate a political
party, but whether one part of a party may silence or regulate another part of the same party.
A constitutional middle ground between political parties as government actors and political parties as purely private associations
appears to be necessary. Over many years of seemingly inconsistent
decisions on the status of political parties, one could argue that
this is ultimately what the Court has delivered. There are many
good reasons, as seen in the White Primary Cases, to hold political
parties accountable for constitutional violations as if they were state
actors. These are instances in which government regulation of a
party appears effectively indistinguishable from a government’s
regulation of itself and it should be treated that way for constitutional purposes. Yet, there are other circumstances where a degree
of autonomy is essential if a party is going to fulfill its core democratic functions, both as a vessel of ideas and a forum for the contestation of ideas. This need for autonomy might seem to call out
for constitutional protection for the party itself. Just what doctrinal
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rule will adequately account for the complex, confounding, sui generis nature of political parties in America? What form should this
middle ground take? Thus far, the in-between constitutional status
for political parties has been achieved through a diverse array of
decisions, each responsive to the facts at hand, but cumulatively
70
lacking in coherence.
Many would agree that constitutional principles should not be
applied ad hoc. Yet, political parties and their activities intersect
with the Constitution in a variety of possible ways. As difficult as the
task may be, courts should ideally strive to devise a set of doctrinal
rules that is responsive to the complex and changeable nature of
political parties in America, yet also provides a needed degree of
clarity and predictability. The remainder of this Article will focus
on, critique, and offer a suggestion to correct one choice made by
the Court: the decision to treat political parties as rights-bearing
entities under the First Amendment’s freedom of association.
IV. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FREEDOM OF THE ASSOCIATION
The command that “Congress make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech” 71 has been interpreted to mean much more
than an assurance that literal “speech” will not be restrained by the
government. The Supreme Court has gradually come to
acknowledge that an individual’s ability to form groups and to associate with others has a close relationship with their ability to
form and express ideas, thus concluding that this right is likewise
72
deserving of First Amendment protection. Over time, however,
the association has itself morphed into a First Amendment rights73
bearing entity. Critics point out that this doctrinal transformation
quietly occurred with distressingly little attention to potential internal dissention and the complex individual dynamics that exist
74
within an organization. As an implied right derived from the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech, the freedom of the association
70. See discussion infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (implicitly accepting, for the first
time, the view that “association” is to be included alongside the textual First Amendment
protections of “speech” and “assembly”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (firmly and explicitly establishing that freedom of association is protected by the
First Amendment).
73. See Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of
Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5 (2012).
74. See id. at 18–25.
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has had a significant impact on the structure of electoral contests
in America, but it is troublingly under-theorized. The Supreme
Court’s Citizens United decision, in which the freedom of speech, by
way of financial expenditures, was guaranteed to corporate entities,
brought to the fore the inherent challenges and contradictions in75
volved in affording expressive rights to collective bodies. However, largely missing from the vigorous debate over the concept of
“corporate speech” has been a line of decisions affording a similar
set of guarantees to another category of collective body: political
parties.
Early decisions on political parties made allusions to the need
for party autonomy and independence. In 1931, Justice Cardozo
referred to “the exercise of inherent powers of the party by the act
76
of its proper officers.” Yet, he seemed to acknowledge that such
inherent powers were often the product of statutory law. There was
no mention of an inherent constitutional right. In 1934, the Texas
Supreme Court argued that, in reference to the Democratic Party,
“[w]ithout the privilege of determining the policy of a political association and its membership, the right to organize such an associ77
ation would be a mere mockery.” The court relied primarily on
the Texas Constitution for direct support, but it also referred tangentially to the First Amendment. However, in Smith v. Allwright,
the U.S. Supreme Court cited and rejected the Texas Supreme
Court’s reasoning; the Court mentioned only the state court’s reliance on the Texas State Constitution, not an implicit freedom of
78
association ostensibly emanating from the First Amendment. Justice Clark’s four-justice concurrence in Terry, while agreeing that
the Jaybird Association was subject to the Fifteenth Amendment’s
dictates, provided a caveat: “Not every private club, association or
league organized to influence public candidacies or political action
must conform to the Constitution’s restrictions on political par79
ties.” Seemingly acknowledging the flip-side of the equation,
Clark suggested that “[c]ertainly a large area of freedom permits
peaceable assembly and concerted private action for political purposes to be exercised separately by white and colored citizens
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alike.” 80 Yet there was no explicit mention of a political party’s First
Amendment freedom of association.
By the 1970s, however, the Court would begin to make the legal
source of political party autonomy increasingly clear, and this
source was to be found in the Constitution: While political parties
were seemingly state actors in certain contexts, as demonstrated by
the White Primary Cases, they were simultaneously entitled to protection as independent entities under the implicit associational
rights of the First Amendment. Two steps were required to reach
this conclusion. First, freedom of speech is interpreted to include
an individual’s ability to join with others. Second, any government
regulation of that association is seen as an infringement on that
individual’s associational rights to join the association of their
choice, since such regulation will, to some extent, alter the nature
of that association.
The first step is a principle that dates back at least as far as 1927,
when the Court in Whitney v. California—although rejecting the defendant’s claim of First Amendment protection—implicitly accepted that an individual’s right to associate with others is included in
the bundle of First Amendment rights, even though the word “as81
sociation” is nowhere to be found in the amendment. By the late
1950s, the Court would explicitly strike down a law that interfered
82
with an individual’s right to associate. The context of NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson was case-specific: a civil rights era decision
addressing an Alabama law that required public disclosure of the
state membership lists, including the NAACP, an organization at
83
the center of the civil rights storm. It was a requirement that potentially put the safety of the members and their families in jeopardy, establishing a powerful deterrent to associate with the organ84
ization. Nevertheless, the 1958 decision was a narrow one.
Although Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court articulated for the
first time how the freedom to associate relates to an individual’s
right of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, the opin85
ion was narrowly tailored to address the unique facts at hand. Indeed, First Amendment scholar John Inazu observed that there was
significant internal discord among the members of the Court as to
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whether and to what extent the decision should be doctrinally
86
rooted in the First Amendment at all. Over time, however, this
freedom of association expanded to apply to a wide range of contexts. By the 1970s, the freedom to join together with a major political party of one’s choice, previously a right without a committed
constitutional home, would be explicitly grounded in the implicit
87
freedom of association in the First Amendment.
The second step toward broad First Amendment-based autonomy for political parties, however, required adding another link to
the proverbial logic chain of expressive freedom—a chain that
seemed to be getting further and further in proximity from the
explicit free speech guarantee laid out in the First Amendment.
That is, to the extent that the association or political party is regulated at all by the government, the individual’s right to join with
that group may be said to be hindered, as the law might require the
group to alter its fundamental nature. In the 1975 decision Cousins
v. Wigoda, which addressed a conflict between a state’s election
laws and a national party’s rules for seating delegates to its national
convention, the Court was unequivocal: “The National Democratic
Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of
88
political association.” It then went on to argue that “[any] interference with the freedom of the party is simultaneously an inter89
ference with the freedom of its adherents.”
To the extent that political parties are the state, this principle is
oxymoronic. If they are creatures of the state, political parties are
products of law. Law thus could not be said to interfere with an entity that would not exist but for the law. Admittedly, as discussed
above, earlier decisions such as the White Primary Cases have not
gone as far as to conclude that political party action is always state
action. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental tension between, on
one hand, the conclusion that parties are to be treated for some
purposes as state actors subject to constitutional constraints and,
on the other hand, private associations that are entitled to constitutional protection from government.
It is possible to critique the assertion in Cousins that any regulation that impinges on the structural or procedural choices of a political party necessarily detracts from the freedom of individual

86. John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 485, 514–16 (2010).
87. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 487–88 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
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members. As discussed previously, political parties are multifaceted
organizations with a multiplicity of roles and inherent—but variable—internecine tensions. As Michael Kang argues, they “are diverse aggregations of political actors that variously work together
and oppose one another across and inside party lines . . . .
[I]ndividual leaders come together for common goals but at the
same time compete vigorously with one another for relative influ90
ence within the party coalition.” Some may see regulations as “an
interference” with the party, but others may find that they bolster
the “freedom of adherents” by establishing procedures that, for
example, reduce the influence of the smoke-filled room, boost
transparency, or ensure a greater role for rank-and-file members of
the party. In other words, there is no reason to assume that the
rules imposed by party insiders will result in greater expressive
freedom than laws imposed by state legislatures intended to improve upon the democratic process.
Yet, by constitutionalizing the political party as an expressive association entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court tilted
the scales with precisely this assumption, and, at the same time,
gave itself a profound new role as the arbiter of quality election
policy. It is a role that the Court is arguably ill-equipped to fill. After Cousins, it was the Court’s job to assess the merits, both practical and theoretical, of regulatory attempts to improve upon or
manage America’s two-party system. The majority in Cousins adopted a relatively high bar for determining whether a particular governmental “interference” with a political party is to pass constitutional muster. In the Court’s view, the state government failed to
demonstrate that “protecting the integrity of its electoral process”
constituted a compelling interest for enforcing election laws that
would trump the party’s determination of which delegates should
91
be seated at its national convention. After Cousins, it is up to the
Court to make a case-by-case, determination of whether particular
election laws affecting political parties are sufficiently “compelling”
to be constitutionally justified.
This Cousins principle would prove to be enduring. Six years later, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
the Court once again struck down a state law that conflicted with a
92
national party’s convention rules. This time, the law required that
90. Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics of Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131,
134 (2005).
91. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491.
92. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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the state’s delegates to the national convention be bound to the
93
candidate who was victorious in the state’s open primary. This selection through an open primary process—in other words, one
that was open to non-party voters—violated the Democratic Party’s
94
rules. The party argued that allowing non-party participation
would dilute the voting strength of members of the Democratic
95
Party. The Court devoted a good deal of the opinion to outlining
the reasons for such a rule, even citing political science literature
96
that supported the national party’s decision to institute it. The
state had its own reasons for its law, specifically “preserving the
overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the
ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing
97
harassment of voters.” The Court was not convinced that the
State’s argument was a compelling one. It concluded that “the interests advanced by the State do not justify its substantial intrusion
98
into the associational freedom of members of the National Party.”
The Court declared the law to be an unconstitutional intrusion in99
to associational freedom.
Ironically, after arriving at its holding by immersing itself in the
pros and cons of Wisconsin’s rule, the majority waved the flag of
judicial modesty, professing that it was “not for the courts to medi100
ate the merits of this dispute.” How could it make such a claim
when its opinion seemed to do precisely that, by weighing the respective substantive arguments of the Party and the State and then
deciding which perspective was more convincing? The only palatable response is that the Court was now applying a presumption of
unconstitutionality to regulations on parties. In other words, the
default was now that “a State, or a court, may not constitutionally
101
substitute its own judgment for that of the Party.” This dramatic
assertion was a far cry from the middle-ground approach it seemed
to take in earlier cases, which acknowledged political parties as
quasi-state actors. Indeed, the Court backed away quite dramatically from prior decisions in which it readily admitted the sometimes
almost-inseparable relationship between party primaries and the
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electoral process. In a sharply worded footnote, the Court rejected
the State’s claim of authority over the electoral process under Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that
the state is to determine how electors for president are to be chosen. Devoid of the nuance in Classic and the White Primary Cas102
es, the Court asserted that “[a]ny connection between the process of selecting electors and the means by which political party
members in a State associate to elect delegates to party nominating
conventions is so remote and tenuous as to be wholly without con103
stitutional significance.”
Three dissenters took a similar approach, thus willingly balancing the associational interests of the party against state electoral
policy interests on a case-by-case basis, but they came to a very different conclusion. The dissenters examined Wisconsin’s law in
light of the State’s longstanding goal to “enlarge citizen participation in the political process and to remove from the political bosses
104
the process of selecting candidates” and acknowledged how the
open primary, by eliminating “potential pressures from political
105
organizations on voters to affiliate” serves this end. The dissent
went on to weigh the lack of evidence that party raiding—the risk
that a party’s opponent will abuse the open primary system to vote
for the opposition party’s candidate thought to be the weakest—is
106
a problem in Wisconsin. In engaging in these debates with a
fined toothed comb and constitutionalizing their conclusions, the
Court had clearly jumped head first into the political thicket.
There are strong arguments that the Supreme Court’s freedom
of association jurisprudence, broadly construed, is deeply prob107
lematic. The Founders framed the First Amendment in human
terms. What began as an individual First Amendment right to join
with a group for expressive purposes, which was derived from that
individual’s explicit right to speak in the First Amendment, over
time became a right possessed by the association itself. If this association is a legal entity, contradictions and tensions between the
individual’s expressive freedom and the association’s purported
freedom become increasingly apparent. Justice Scalia, who was in
the majority in the controversial Citizens United decision that af-
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forded corporations (a kind of association) a free speech right to
spend unlimited sums on political “speech,” has acknowledged
“that when the Framers ‘constitutionalized the right to free speech
in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Amer108
icans that they had in mind.’” Scalia’s justification for expanding
this right beyond the individual was the seemingly intuitive assumption that an “individual person’s right to speak, includes the
109
right to speak in association with other individual persons.” However,
individual speech and associational speech are fundamentally different and often irreconcilable.
As a collective, each association has its own distinctive procedure
and method for determining who gets to do “the speaking” for the
association and what is to be said. Some associations may be highly
democratic and make majoritarian decisions, and some may use
ownership share as a metric for determining influence. Others may
rely on strong leaders and backroom deals to determine the content of official associational speech. Large numbers of association
members may disagree vehemently with many of the speech choices made by the powers that be within the association. Attaching a
constitutional status to such “speech” has the perverse effect of endowing an idiosyncratic internal structure, responsible for churning out authorized associational speech, with the blessing and protection of the highest law in the land. At the same time, it
potentially sidelines the individuals who were the intended benefi110
ciaries of the First Amendment.
Such concerns are particularly germane to political parties. As
mentioned earlier, the very extent to which political parties are independent non-governmental associations is itself questionable. As
Elizabeth Garrett explains, “[t]he major parties make up government and provide a structure to mediate among citizens, interest
111
groups, and government officials.” However, the critique of the
characterization of political parties as rights-bearing associations
runs much deeper than this. The very nature of party membership
is up for debate. The two major political parties are vast and diverse organizations that have each recently comprised around
112
twenty-five to forty percent of the American voting population.

108. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 391 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 392.
110. See Batchis, supra note 73, at 35–39.
111. Garrett, supra note 7, at 111.
112. See
Party
Affiliation,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/partyaffiliation.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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While it is common to think of party membership as constituting
those registered with a particular party, members may instead be
defined as all voters for a party’s candidate (whether registered or
not), party leaders, party activists, officeholders, office seekers, interest groups, or all of the above. Garrett argues that
the ease in which courts and others refer to political parties
as “membership organizations” masks the difficulties involved in figuring out whether there are any individuals or
groups that are properly characterized as “members” in the
usual sense of that word. Political parties are aggregations
of many kinds of interests, some individual and many col113
lective.
In short, there are compelling reasons to doubt that the major
parties should be treated as one speaker with one voice for First
Amendment purposes because they represent such enormous
swaths of the American electorate and are comprised of individuals
and groups with an almost unfathomable range of interests, attitudes, experiences, and perspectives.
Nevertheless, over the three and a half decades following Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, the Court would maintain a case-by-case
approach to the freedom of association of political parties. The
cumulative results are messy and incoherent, with members of the
Court readily admitting that balancing the “two vital interests” of
associational freedom and “fair and effective” participation “does
not lend itself to bright-line rules but requires careful inquiry into
the extent to which the one or the other interest is inordinately
114
impaired under the facts of the particular case.” As explored in
later sections of this Article, a majority of the Court has broken in
different directions in different cases. At times, it has struck down
regulations on political parties as unacceptably intrusive into their
associational rights—for example, invalidating laws that prohibit
115
party endorsements in primaries, laws that do not allow inde116
pendents to vote in a party’s primaries against that party’s wishes,
117
and laws mandating a blanket primary. At other times, it has upheld laws regulating political parties—for example, a law institut113.
114.
ing).
115.
116.
117.

Garrett, supra note 7, at 109.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 234 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissentEu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 214–16 (1989).
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210–11.
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
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ing a top-two primary in which the top two candidates, regardless
118
of party, confront each other in the general election and a law
establishing semi-closed primaries, which preclude parties from
119
opening their primaries to members of other parties. In all of
these cases, there were strong dissents by justices whose ad hoc
balance would have resulted in a different outcome, belying any
optimism that consistent and predicable principles might ultimately emerge from this body of jurisprudence. Numerous scholars
have roundly criticized the Court for its approach and inconsisten120
cy on political parties.
V. A NEW PARADIGM: THE POLITICAL PARTY AS PUBLIC FORUM
What if political parties were not treated as rights bearing entities at all? Pioneering election law scholar Daniel Lowenstein has
argued that accepting the theory that political parties are entitled
to associational rights was an “unwelcome step” by the Supreme
121
Court. To Lowenstein, “the major parties constitute the government, and when constitutional challenges are presented in the
name of these parties, the parties are complaining about some122
thing they have done to themselves.” These words, however, were
written in 1993, well before the government speech doctrine was
articulated by the Court. As alluded to earlier, the prospect of
treating parties as government, as well as the subsequent application
of the government speech doctrine, would be intolerable. The
temptation by the party in power to systematically rid the parties of
all inter- or intraparty dissent would be unlimited, effectively killing one of the most critical functions of parties as vehicle for debate. Yet, we might readily agree with Lowenstein that the “conventional First Amendment framework simply does not fit the major
political parties, their relationship with the government that they
structure, or the claims pressed in the name of their freedom of as123
sociation.”
I propose, however, that there is an alternative available, a doctrine that provides a surprisingly good fit for the peculiar institu118. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 458–59 (2008).
119. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 598 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 7, at 92–100; Garrett, supra note 7, at 95–96; Persily &
Cain, supra note 7, at, 775–79; Lowenstein, supra note 6, at, 1741–43.
121. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1742.
122. Id. at 1758.
123. Id. at 1791.
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tion that is the political party. Ever since Justice Owen Roberts, in
1939, penned his famous dictum in Hague v. CIO, the public forum
doctrine has come to stand for the idea that government is not limited to one of two roles, of speaker or speech regulator. In some
contexts, government must act as a speech facilitator. Why? Because
government monopolizes the public realm. Thus, on one hand,
the Court has come to acknowledge that a big part of governing
involves government speech by selectively choosing which ideas to
convey and promote. On the other hand, it involves maintaining a
public sphere in which free expression must be unimpeded without selective interference. The quintessential example is the public
park. Streets and parks, Justice Roberts famously explained,
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
124
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
This perspective represented a dramatic jurisprudential shift
from what had effectively been a “government speech” approach—
well before this conceptualization became an identifiable doctrinal
category. Prior to Hague, the government was treated like any private deed holder, with complete power to allow or disallow particular speech on its property, regardless of the public nature of the
125
space.
The public forum doctrine, however, rejected this broad, unrestrained conception of governmental power in which the First
Amendment would present no obstacle to government censorship
in critical settings where the public traditionally has made its voice
heard. In the years following Hague, the idea of the public forum—
venues that are constitutionally protected for broad and diverse
expressive freedom yet simultaneously government controlled—
would expand well-beyond the public park. The public forum category would grow to apply to more than just property-based venues
for expression. Thus, an interschool mail system that is open to the
126
public might be considered to be a public forum, as well as a
school district’s properties that are made available outside of
124.
125.
126.

Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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school hours for social and civic uses, 127 and even a student organi128
zation fund at a public law school.
It is important to note that the Court has never required complete immunity from regulation simply by virtue of identifying a
venue as a public forum. Far from it. As we shall see, the Court has
drawn categorical distinctions between different types of public fora and afforded them differing levels of constitutional immunity.
Roberts himself acknowledged in Hague that even in a quintessen129
tial public forum, expressive rights are “not absolute.” They may
130
be “regulated” but not “abridged or denied.” It does not require
great mental acuity to understand why Roberts would provide such
a caveat. Public fora are, by definition, creatures of the government. Indeed, they are largely creations of the government. A public park could not exist as a public park, unless sufficient government regulation could ensure that it is at least minimally
identifiable, functional, clean, and well-maintained. Most such
regulations are bound to have an impact on expression—even if it
is just on the margins. Laws maintaining order and cleanliness or
determining the location or presence of trees, signage, fountains
or concrete public squares may affect if and how private expression
is conveyed in the park. Yet, few would argue that the First
Amendment precludes the government from making such fundamental regulatory interventions. Indeed, most would likely agree
that it is a critical responsibility of government to make such regulatory choices with regard to the public realm.
As discussed, the political party system in America is in many
ways a constitutional conundrum. And the notion of a public forum was itself a riddle that took the Court a long time to reconcile.
Upon reflection, this problem and solution are just waiting to be
united. The political party system has a surprising amount in
common with a public park or other public fora. As essential and
fundamental elements of our electoral system political parties are
invariably subject to significant government regulation, both for
practical reasons, such as incorporating party elections into the
mechanics of the state-run voting apparatus, and normative reasons, such as structuring the electoral process to maximize its core
democratic attributes. For good or ill, the two major political par-

127.
(1993).
128.
129.
130.

Lamb’s Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396–97
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 698 (2010).
Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
Id.
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ties are incorporated into the very architecture of American government, from the leadership hierarchy in Congress to the composition of independent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. At the same time, political parties are among
the most important vehicles by which individuals join together to
disseminate, generate, and contest political ideas. To most scholars
and jurists, political speech pertaining to public issues lies at the
131
very heart of the First Amendment. Like other public fora, the
political party system both is government and must be free from government. It is precisely this type of paradox that the public forum
doctrine was designed to accommodate.
VI. THE MECHANICS OF PUBLIC FORA
The Court has over time articulated a number of types of public
fora. The public forum concept originated as a reference to public
places such as “streets and parks,” which by long-standing tradition
were used for assembly, debate, and general expressive activity.132
These quintessential public fora were eventually joined by another
category of public forum: the designated forum, or those that were
open by the government to the public by choice or designation. In
all of these public fora, “the government may not prohibit all
133
communicative activity” but “[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter134
est.” However, the Court has most recently designated a third
category of public forum, which is “created for a limited purpose
135
such as use by certain groups.” In a “limited public forum,” the
First Amendment constraints on government regulation, while still
significant, are somewhat more permissive. Restrictions on speech
or barriers to access must simply “be reasonable and viewpoint
136
neutral.” This Part argues that political parties have the attributes
of a limited public forum.

131. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); N.Y. Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 717–24 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27 (1948).
132. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
133. Id. at 45.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 46 n.7.
136. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010).
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It seems relatively clear that political parties would not qualify as
quintessential public fora, such as a public sidewalk or park. The
Court has not been willing to expand traditional public forum category beyond public thoroughfares and parks. Thus, if the public
forum doctrine were applied to the political party system, courts
would have to determine whether political parties should be classified as either designated public fora with greater First Amendment
immunity from expression-related regulation, or as limited public
fora with a somewhat lesser protected status. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Court concluded that a public-universitysponsored system of official recognition for student groups was a
137
limited public forum. In a brief footnote, it explained that all
parties agreed on the system’s categorization as a limited public forum, which was defined as when “governmental entities [open]
property ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to
138
the discussion of certain subjects.’” The public law school at issue
required that student organizations, in order to receive official status, abide by a nondiscrimination policy-interpreted to mandate
139
that such groups “accept-all-comers.” For the Christian Legal Society (CLS), this meant that it was faced with a choice: either
change its policy and no longer deny membership to openly gay
140
students or forgo registered student organization (RSO) status.
The analogy to American political parties is hard to ignore. In
countless ways, the government officially sponsors a two-party system, which, even more so than in the case of official student
groups at a public university, serves an essential function that furthers and is incorporated into the institution’s central mission of
representative government. Comparable to the “benefits [that] attend this school-approved status” as an RSO at a public law school,
the two major political parties are afforded significant governmentally-endowed benefits that attach to their official status—
including, of course, being integrated into the very structure of
American democracy and voting procedure. Just like a potentialRSO, as associations of ideologically, culturally, and socially united
individuals, political parties are free to exist without the benefits
that accompany official status. In the case of a political party, if it
chose not to comply with applicable government regulations, it
would simply be denied benefits that accompany activity in the
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 679 n.12.
Id. at 679 n.11.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
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public forum, including access to government-administered ballots
and designated party-based bureaucratic posts. The association
could continue to exist in a different form; instead of a political
party, it would simply be identified as an interest group. Finally,
there is the accept-all-comers non-discrimination requirement that
any group that meets certain baseline criteria must be permitted to
be a part of the expressive forum. To qualify as an official RSO, a
group had to be a noncommercial organization comprised of only
students at the institution, but it must have nevertheless been open
to all students. This is analogous to the American two-party system
in that any American eligible to vote may generally become a
member of either party simply by registering with that party. The
Court has prohibited the discriminatory denial of such open
141
membership.
Perhaps the most significant distinguishing attribute of the RSO
system—when contrasted with the reigning First Amendment paradigm applicable to America’s political party system—is that, while
the Martinez Court readily accepted the claim that both expressive
association and the public forum doctrine were at play, courts have
only applied the former to political parties. The Supreme Court
has failed to entertain the notion that the party system is, in fact, a
type of public forum. Granted, Martinez might be understood as
addressing two discrete First Amendment questions: first, the ability to utilize a public forum without discrimination based on belief;
and second, the ability of an expressive association to control its
message through control over its membership. However, Martinez
is an excellent illustration of how distinctions between expressive
association analysis and public forum analysis invariably break
down. The Court ultimately acknowledged this convergence in
Martinez. At first take, in both the RSO and political party contexts,
it is possible to see two separable and isolatable units of First
Amendment analysis: first, the Christian Legal Society and Political
Party as independent expressive associations with their own rights;
and second, the government-established, -owned, or -controlled
package of benefits or property that is the public forum. However,
when the Christian association in Martinez requested that the Court
“engage each line of cases independently,” the Court said no. In
the Court’s view, because the two arguments effectively
“merge[, . . .] limited-public forum precedents supply the appro-

141.

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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priate framework for assessing both CLS’s speech and association
142
rights.”
The argument for such a merger is even stronger in the political
party context, which suggests that it is the public forum doctrine,
and not expressive association, that should govern any First
Amendment issues. Once political parties accept the benefits of
political party status, they become a part of the political party system, as it is a limited public forum designed for democracyfacilitating purposes. As such, under public forum principles, they
may be regulated within certain bounds. Likewise, the Christian
Legal Society, once it became a part of the RSO system, may be
recognized as both a participant in and part of the limited public
forum. It became an organization that may be regulated within
First Amendment limits, such that it serves the narrow set of interests and needs of the public institution. “[W]ithout controversy,”
the organization may be limited by regulation to “comprising only
143
students” as members, just as the Republican Party may presumably be prohibited by law from allowing seven-year-old political aficionados from registering as party members. Outside of this limited public forum context, a private expressive association has
significant constitutional freedom to define or limit its own mem144
bership however it sees fit. However, in the context of a merger
between expressive association and limited public forum, it becomes impossible to truly disaggregate the association from the forum. As the Court explains, “the strict scrutiny we have applied in
some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in
practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of limited pub145
lic forums—the State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.’”
Reserving public fora for certain groups and purposes must, as a
corollary, involve defining with those groups and purposes with
some specificity. Defining these groups and purposes must mean
establishing who is in and who is out through a regulatory regime.
As long as this is achieved in a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral
way, the limited public forum doctrine suggests that such regulations are consistent with the First Amendment.
The Court employs a carrot versus stick metaphor to justify
greater First Amendment lenience. Such lenience might arguably

142. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 680.
143. Id. at 681.
144. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
145. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 681 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).

472

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 52:2

apply to all instances in which expressive association rights are
claimed in the context of a limited public forum. The Court explains: “In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits. . . . Application of the less restrictive limited-public-forum
analysis better accounts for the fact that [the public institution],
through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not
146
wielding the stick of prohibition.” A similar conclusion can be
drawn with regard to parties since no interest group is compelled
to become a political party, even though becoming one entitles
that association to the vast benefit of participating in and becoming an official part of the formal structure of American democracy.” The party system is arguably one hundred percent carrot, justifying the government’s ability to impose reasonable viewpoint147
neutral regulations without violating the First Amendment.
In instances when public universities engaged in viewpoint discrimination against student groups, the Court concluded that the
institution’s actions were unconstitutional, which is consistent with
148
the limited public forum doctrine. Throughout these cases, the
Court has shown sensitivity to the judiciary’s lack of experience in
the educational field and the need for judicial restraint, humility,
and deference. “Cognizant that judges lack on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators[,] . . . we have cautioned courts in various contexts to resist ‘substitut[ing] their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school author149
ities which they review.’” With such striking parallels to the political party system and the efforts of states and localities to impose
reasonable viewpoint-neutral regulations on political parties, one
might question why the Court has not relied upon a similar sentiment of judicial modesty to guide its political party jurisprudence.
As Elizabeth Garrett explains, many

146. Id. at 682–83 (citation omitted).
147. One scholar has argued that because of this, political parties might be viewed under
the unconstitutional conditions rubric. In other words, states may offer benefits to parties in
exchange for parties voluntarily accepting a limitation on their own First Amendment rights;
however, in certain circumstances, such a relinquishment of rights will constitute an unconstitutional condition. See Dimino, supra note 7, at 66–67.
148. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
149. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686 (quoting Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206
(1982)).
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outcomes are often consistent with plausible visions of
democratic institutions. Thus, to decide political party cases, judges are very likely to rely on their own views of the
best governance structures for a stable democracy. This
means that one contested view of the role of political par150
ties is . . . constitutionalized.
It also means that state innovation may be stymied. As Justice
Stevens once argued in dissent, “[s]tates should be free to experiment with reforms designed to make the democratic process more
151
robust.”
In 2008, Justice Scalia lamented a Court decision that allowed
Washington State’s primary law to stand. Washington’s system replaced internal party primaries with a top-two primary that included the entire field of candidates regardless of party. In Scalia’s dissenting view, there was “no state interest behind this law except the
Washington legislature’s dislike for bright-colors partisanship, and
its desire to blunt the ability of political parties with noncentrist
152
views to endorse and advocate their own candidates.” Many respectable thinkers may share Scalia’s apparent distaste for centrism. The virtues or vices of electoral legal structures that discourage polarization are worthy of debate. However, this does not
necessarily make it a constitutional debate. In that case, Scalia was
troubled because candidates would be able to list their preferred
party on the ballot without regard to whether the party wished for
them to do so. But the parallels to Martinez are striking. Just as the
student organizations were required to accept all comers, Scalia
was concerned that parties were “compelled to associate with a per153
son whose views the group does not accept.” But in a limited
public forum, a state is permitted to make a policy judgment that
gives greater weight to a countervailing interest, one that is in
some ways irreconcilable with this ostensible associational right:
the expressive interest of the candidate himself to communicate his
party preference. Under the public forum rubric, states would be
free to structure election laws such that the individuals who are affected by the forum have expressive priority, rather than the parties qua parties.

150. Garrett, supra note 7, at 131.
151. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 601 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 470 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 463.
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In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, the
Court struck down provisions in the California Elections Code that
dictated the term of office for party chairs, required the geographic rotation of such chairs between the northern and southern parts
of the state, and prohibited party governing bodies from publicly
endorsing party-primary candidates. 154 In rejecting the constitutionality of the ban on pre-primary party endorsements, the Court
emphasized the right of parties “to select a standard bearer who
155
It
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”
156
claimed that the California regulation “suffocates this right.”
However, it is really a question of how, rather than if. The Court’s
current case law suggests that this choice of a standard bearer is a
form of associational speech. However, there are limitless possible
procedures for choosing such a standard bearer. Different procedures have differing implications for different party members, and
they may very well result in different “speech.” The “speech” of the
association is in significant part determined by the procedures
used to determine what the speech shall be. Some procedures may
benefit the party elites, giving their views relatively more weight in
determining what will ultimately be “spoken” by the party. Other
procedures may have the opposite effect, placing a thumb on the
scale for everyday rank-and-file party members.
To California legislators representing the people of the state,
the best procedure for determining the party voice regarding its
standard bearer was a primary vote by party members, without the
influence of a pre-vote endorsement. The Court remained unconvinced, proclaiming its doubt “that the silencing of official party
committees, alone among various groups interested in the outcome of a primary election, is key to protecting voters from confusion. . . . The State makes no showing, moreover, that voters are
157
unduly influenced by party endorsements.” But why should the
state have to convince the Court that its policy choices are optimal?
Is it not the role of the state government to seek to improve upon
its democratic process through trial and error, particularly where
the entity being regulated has been incorporated by law into this
process? By granting partial constitutional immunity to the two
parties that effectively monopolize America’s political system, the

154.
155.
156.
157.

Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989).
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 228 n.18.
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Court diluted a democratic check on the process by which these
parties go about their democratically-essential work.
If, however, we do away with the misguided characterization of
parties as rights-bearing associations and replace it with a public
forum formulation, the outcome begins to look much more sensible. As Martinez demonstrates, opening a limited public forum invariably involves establishing reasonable standards for participation
through regulation. Yet government regulation would remain constrained in important ways. The state of California could not, for
example, make viewpoint-based distinctions as to what type of
standard-bearers may or may not be endorsed by a political party.
Because this would not be considered government speech, the
State could not selectively prohibit only endorsements of racist
candidates, anti-Catholic bigots, or candidates that are not mem158
bers of unions. It could, however, decide on reasonable rules to
structure the forum so that it best achieves its public purpose.
If a state or locality opts to remove a large and obtrusive stage in
the middle of a public park and replace it with a number of discrete areas in which smaller groups of people may gather and interact, few would assert that this constitutes a First Amendment violation. Landscape design necessitates choice, and a governmental
authority might reasonably prefer a design that encourages a
greater diversity of smaller scale expressive activity, as opposed to a
design that accommodates only a single speaker who will likely
dominate the entire public forum. Both are respectable choices,
whether as a single stage directing all attention to one or two voices or a greater number of smaller venues encouraging a plurality of
voices. The government’s role under the public forum doctrine is
to manage scarce public resources by making informed choices
about how they should be best structured, whether that government has only two major public parks in a small city or two major
political parties in a large country. The two major political parties
have become a fixture of our political system, and the system has
solidified over a century and a half because of a range of social
forces but also, in large part, by explicit government action. The
two parties are central to the functioning of American democracy.
They are scarce resources, and as such, regulatory choice is a necessity.

158.

See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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VII. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE FIT: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
In American jurisprudence, constitutional doctrine evolves on a
case-by-case basis. Like the common law system more generally,
this process has many strengths. It allows constitutional change to
occur incrementally, as the Court is confronted with new challenges that test the meaning of constitutional precepts in unanticipated
ways. Thus, at the time of the White Primary Cases, it became clear
that vital constitutional interests justified treating ostensibly independent political parties as state actors subject to the commands of
the Civil War Amendments. As freedom of association evolved as a
distinctive constitutional right in other contexts, however, the
Court came to treat political parties in a very different manner, as
independent entities that are entitled to autonomy from government. As discussed, these two conceptions of the political party are
in clear tension with one another. When we pull back, the doctrinal “big picture” becomes messy. And indeed, perhaps it is an excellent illustration of how the natural process of case-by-case constitutional evolution, by focusing on each tree one at a time, can
sometimes harvest a rather ugly forest. We end up stuck on a jurisprudential path that is not ideal; here, this course requires courts
to treat political parties as two contradictory things at once.
To take one example, in the 1986 case Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Connecticut’s closed primary law, under which the Republican Party
would have been barred, against its wishes, from allowing inde159
pendents to vote in its primary. The majority effectively conceded that it faced what appeared to be two conflicting constitutional
commands. It agreed that under Article I, Section 4, clause 1, “the
Constitution grants the States a broad power to proscribe the
‘Time, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
160
Representatives.” Looking back to Classic and Allwright, the Court
explained that “‘[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary
effectively controls the choice,’ the requirements of Article [I, Section 2], clause 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment apply to prima161
ries as well as to general elections.” Accordingly, on one hand,
given the fact that the government is responsible for establishing
and regulating the ballot box (and party primary voting is a large
159.
160.
161.
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part of this responsibility), “party action” would appear to be “state
action.” On the other hand, however, the Court tells us that, under
the First Amendment, party members have a right to freely associate “with like-minded citizens,” and that any “interference with the
162
freedom of a party” intrudes on this individual right.
There are a number of ways to manage this fundamental contradiction. One possibility is to break political parties down into
discrete, bite-sized components. Case by case, particular action by
political parties will be determined either to be state action subject
to complete regulatory control by the government or a type of party behavior that is purely private. The former would be considered
“government speech,” and because the government would be
speaking, the First Amendment would put no limits on the types of
regulations imposed. The latter category of action, however, would
receive full associational protection because it involves a private
expressive entity. Such an approach would ostensibly have the
benefit of clarity when it comes to constitutional results: either
there exists a fully protected expressive association under the First
Amendment or a government speaker that can regulate itself however it sees fit. Yet, aside from the jurisprudential whiplash that
might occur from such bipolar doctrinal treatment, a court may
struggle to draw the line between instances when a political party
acts as the government and when the party acts as an autonomous
independent association; indeed, there is little evidence that the
Court has sought to use a doctrinal scalpel to dissect and categorize party attributes in this manner. There is a good reason for this,
as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to do. A group of individual Republicans who get together to discuss policy ideas might
claim to be in the “full associational freedom” category, but what if
those individuals are members of the House Republican Caucus?
Would the House of Representatives be prohibited by the First
Amendment from regulating itself, from structuring congressional
expression through parliamentary procedure?
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Court took a different approach. According to the methodology above, one might
place the administration of a primary election firmly in the “state
action” category. After all, elections are managed, directed, and
paid for by the state government. However, instead of such a black
or white “litmus-paper test,” the Court articulated a rule that balanced the constitutional benefits with the constitutional burdens

162.

Id. at 215.
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in every case. A “[c]ourt must not only determine the legitimacy
and strength of each of [the state’s and the political party’s] interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make
163
it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Connecticut provided a number of reasons for why it sought to disallow independents
from voting in party primaries: “ensuring the administrability of
the primary system, preventing raiding, avoiding voter confusion,
164
and protecting the responsibility of party government.” To the
party, such a regulation burdened “the right of its members to determine for themselves with whom they will associate, as well as
165
whose support they will seek, in their quest for political success.”
In every case, under the rule articulated in Tashjian, it becomes the
role of the Court to declare who wins and, in the process, to effectively decide what is, and what is not, good policy—and good for
democracy. The Court’s repeated rejection of a “litmus-paper
166
test” has meant that small differences in how a state chooses to
regulate political parties can have profound repercussions. These
repercussions are difficult to justify on consistent and principled
constitutional grounds when one pulls back and looks at the
broader body of political party jurisprudence.
For example, while Connecticut was denied the ability to restrict
who may vote in party primaries in its state, the Court in 2005 al167
lowed Oklahoma to impose a similar restriction. The only difference was that the Oklahoma law imposed “semiclosed” rather than
“closed” primaries. This meant that instead of being prohibited
from allowing independents and members of other parties from
168
voting in their primaries, only the latter were precluded. Such a
distinction might seem relatively inconsequential from the standpoint of the Constitution, but not to the Court in Clingman v. Beaver. Very much unlike its resolution in Tashjian, the Court was
“persuaded that any burden Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary imposes [on parties] is minor and justified by legitimate state inter169
ests.”
To assess the extent of a “burden,” of course, there must presumably be some baseline agreement as to the nature of the interest being burdened. The members of the Clingman Court could
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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only muster a plurality for this part of its opinion, which further illustrates the inherent difficulty of establishing a principled doctrine of associational rights for political parties. The plurality effectively suggested that an individual has little to no associational
interest in voting in another party’s primary if that voter is unwill170
ing to disassociate from his current party. O’Connor and Breyer,
although joining the holding, adamantly disagreed, concluding
that voting in a party primary is typically the key reason individuals
choose to associate with political parties in the first place. Indeed,
in the realm of political parties, voting may be said to be the most
171
critical way of associating. The act of party registration may in
172
fact be a much less significant so-called act of association. To
many, it may simply represent a minor bureaucratic hurdle, a prerequisite to the main associational event: voting for a particular
party’s candidate. In fact, to many Americans, registering with one
of the major political parties may not be conceived of as association at all, but rather a simple means to an end to ensure meaningful access to democratic participation.
Furthermore, even if we assume that there is an associational interest in one’s mere registration as a party member, as O’Connor
most reasonably pointed out, there is little reason to conclude that
associating with one group would somehow negate the concomitant interest in associating with other groups at the same time. This
is particularly true in a political system with institutionalized twoparty dominance, as the size and staggering diversity of the American electorate virtually ensures that few, if any, Americans will be a
precise fit, ideologically and culturally, with one of the two major
political camps. As O’Connor opined, “[w]e surely would not say,
for instance, that a registered Republican or Democrat has no protected interest in associating with the Libertarian Party by attend173
ing meetings or making political contributions.” In sum, the
Court is in discord, not merely over how it should balance the stated regulatory interests of the government against the burdens imposed on the political parties and voters involved, but on the very
nature or existence of associational interests in the first place.
Through a long series of inconsistent decisions, the Court has
ultimately framed the issue of political party regulation as a matter
involving a balancing of directly conflicting constitutional interests.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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The frame utilized by the Court has meant that nebulous and difficult-to-define First Amendment associational interests are repeatedly pitted against the electoral regulatory interests clearly
acknowledged in Article I. The Court has forced itself into a corner, where it has no choice but to resolve complex factual and context-specific matters involving questions of political theory about
which even political scientists and other experts sharply disagree.
Treating political parties as part of a public forum, however,
would largely avoid this conundrum. If the political party system is
reimagined as a type of public forum, the Constitution would no
longer be at odds with itself. Granted, the Constitution’s text does
not explicitly allocate power to states and the federal government
to regulate political parties in Article I, Section 2, clause 1 and Article I, Section 4, clause 1, or provide for the freedom of political
parties to be free from government regulation as expressive associations under the First Amendment. The internal constitutional conflict that currently exists was a product of precedents that derived
implicit meaning from those provisions, thus extending their coverage to political parties through such readings. Nonetheless, reframing the issue as a public forum question would not merely
eliminate this constitutional contradiction; rather, it would actively
promote the constitutional values in both Article I and the First
Amendment. Consistent with the White Primary Cases, a law affecting the political party system would fulfill the government’s explicit
responsibility to “[r]egulat[e]” under Article I, Section 4, clause 1
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
174
and Representatives.” At the same time, as public forums, government regulations would not be permitted to “abridg[e] the
175
freedom of speech” of political parties in a viewpoint-based or
unreasonable manner. A robust body of jurisprudence has developed around the public forum doctrine, which would help ensure
that the government does not abuse its power to regulate these vital outlets for political and ideological contestation. Although political parties are unique and complex institutions—certainly distinct from other public fora confronted by the Court in the past—
principles derived from many decades of public forum case law offer guidance as to where the boundary lies between facilitation of
the electoral process and the abridgment of speech.
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The endorsement ban struck down in Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee, discussed above, provides an illustration. The Court’s take on the California law that prohibited parties
from endorsing candidates prior to a primary was far from subtle:
it agreed with the Court of Appeals that the regulation constituted
176
an “‘outright ban’ on political speech.” Such a law “patently in177
fringes [on] the right of the party to express itself.” It “directly
hampers the ability of a party to spread its message,” is “highly paternalistic,” and is “particularly egregious [in that] the State censors the political speech a political party shares with its mem178
bers.” All of these characterizations, of course, are premised on
the assumption that a political party, as an association, is an autonomous rights-bearing entity that should be treated as the equivalent of an individual who asserts his or her freedom of speech. Had
the Court instead reached back to the White Primary Cases and
characterized the party as a state actor, the conclusion would have
been the precise opposite. As government speech, it would be well
within the state’s discretion to declare that parties will refrain from
expressing a preference for a particular candidate prior to the actual primary vote, just as it was for the federal government to bar
speech about abortion as a lawful option when spoken by health
care providers whose services fall under the auspices of a govern179
ment funded program.
However, if instead of associational speech or government
speech, the political party system in California were to be considered a limited public forum, the Court would be tasked with determining whether this prohibition on pre-primary party endorsements fits into the constitutional sweet spot: a reasonable
regulation that does not abridge free speech on the basis of a
speaker’s viewpoint. Is this a regulation comparable to a city ordinance that limits a particular public theater’s stage capacity to x
people? In such a case, a speaker might want to use that theater to
express herself at a particular time, but she may be barred by the
regulation from doing so because this would bring its occupancy to
x + 1. A public theater can accommodate only so many people before the ability to safely and effectively use it for expression and
180
other purposes begins to diminish appreciably. Certainly, the
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government must also determine a fair way of allocating its use,
which presumes that only one theatrical production may occur at a
time and that time is finite. Such regulations clearly limit expression. But as the Court has held, because a public theater is a public
forum, it would not become a First Amendment abridgement unless choices are made without “procedural safeguards that reduce
181
the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.”
However, one might respond that a public theater is a poor
analogy for a political party in that a public theater, by its nature,
provides opportunity for finite expressive use and can facilitate only so many voices over the course of a year, located within a constrained space that can fit only so many listeners. However, a political party faces similar constraints. Once a party officially endorses
one candidate among many in its primary, it has fundamentally altered itself as a forum. There are only two major parties, and one
of two now functions differently. Like tearing out all of the seats
from a public theater to facilitate its use as a mosh pit, the nature
of the forum is transformed. Just as that theater without seats will
be less useful as an opera house and more appropriate for rock
concerts, that political party with an official endorsement will presumably serve less effectively as an open forum for broadly and evenhandedly weighing the merits of candidates within a certain ideological range, and it will perhaps function more effectively as an
organization advocating a narrower vision, less amenable to a wide
range of viewpoints. It cannot be both of these things at once. Under the public forum doctrine, a government’s choice to adopt one
structure over the other would likely not in itself present a First
Amendment issue, as long as it is procedurally fair and not a form
of viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court has famously held
that a constitutional violation occurred where a city, without such
procedures, denied a production company the opportunity to use
182
a public theater to perform the controversial musical Hair.
If political parties were treated as public forums, the Court in Eu
would not have been in the awkward position of playing political
scientist. Granted, utilizing the public forum doctrine comes with
its own set of challenges. Over time, courts would flesh out the distinctions between permissible regulations on political parties, those
that are reasonable and non-viewpoint based according to the limited public forum test, and regulations that violate this rule. How-
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ever, courts are arguably much better equipped to make First
Amendment distinctions, such as whether speech regulation is
viewpoint-based or content-based and whether such regulation is
minimally “reasonable,” than they are to make fine-grained policy
assessments of the merits or demerits of a wide range of highlydebatable electoral policies implemented by states and the federal
government.
With the limited public forum framework, the Court would not
have been tasked with determining whether or not California correctly asserted that promoting “stable government and protecting
voters from confusion and undue influence” constituted a “com183
pelling government interest” that justified a ban on pre-primary
party endorsements. Instead, the Court would have considered
how this prohibition fit with the purpose and traditional use of the
public forum. Like a board’s decision to reject a production of
Hair at a municipal theater, it is possible that a prohibition on en184
dorsements might be characterized as a prior restraint. However,
if the party system is understood as a limited public forum and the
restriction is applied using a fair and non-discriminatory procedure that is applied in the same manner to all major parties, it
would likely pass constitutional muster. Unlike with a government
speech regime, the state could not simply pick and choose which
endorsements to allow or disallow in order to promote particular
ideological or policy objectives. And unlike the associational
speech framework, a political party made up of millions of diverse
individuals would not be reified and treated as if it had a single
First Amendment voice. Instead, political parties would receive
First Amendment treatment sensitive to their status as hybrid entities that are neither fully governmental nor solely private.
CONCLUSION
Election law structures the process by which diverse ideas compete in America’s democratic marketplace. The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech is clearly relevant to this endeavor, and it
should not be ignored as state and federal governments regulate
America’s electoral system. The free exchange of ideas allows for
the drawing of ideological contrasts and for translating these dif-
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ferences into competitive electoral contests with tangible consequences, as elected leaders implement particular policy choices
and decisively reject others. Yet, there is a vast array of ways to
structure the electoral process in America. It is critical that the
First Amendment is not used to unreasonably impede the important work election law plays in keeping representative government strong. The First Amendment should allow for innovative
and diverse approaches to election administration, tailored to a variety of needs and concerns, by a variety of jurisdictions. Yes, vigorous and expansive First Amendment doctrine can enlarge and
strengthen the opportunities for democratic participation. Less often acknowledged, however, is the fact that similarly vigorous and
expansive First Amendment doctrine may have the very opposite
outcome if improperly applied.
Outside of broad constitutional parameters, the Founding generation did not dictate the fine-grained details of how America’s
electoral system should operate. They embedded flexibility into
election law by explicitly not constitutionalizing core issues—
commanding, for example, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre185
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” America’s electoral process has taken shape over two centuries through conscious
choice, trial and error, evolving social norms, inertia, and a combination of many other factors. When the Court adopts the constitutional view that political parties should be treated as rightsbearing expressive associations, it risks rigidifying structural components of American election law that should remain flexible. At
the same time, because the Court is not blind to the reality that political parties are intimately intertwined with government, attempts
at consistent and principled doctrinal categorization have inevitably devolved into an unsatisfying and unpredictable form of ad hoc
balancing. Such jurisprudence denies governments the freedom to
innovate and adapt that the Framers built into the American electoral system. It also instills great uncertainty into governmental efforts to improve upon election law. When political parties are perceived as expressive associations, it becomes the role of the Court,
which is made up of justices with a range of views on the democratic “good,” to declare just what kind of party system is optimal. Not
only does this take the choice of election law procedure out of the
hands of the people’s democratically elected leaders, and instead
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put those decisions in the hands of unelected judges, many would
agree that judges are simply ill-equipped to fulfill this role.
There is a better way. The ad hoc expressive association analysis
the Court currently uses to test the constitutional soundness of political party regulations should be replaced by a public forum analysis. The public forum doctrine better accommodates the conundrum of political parties. Major political parties are both critical
vehicles for private speech and creatures of government. Governments could subject the political party system to reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulations, without fear that a court’s ad hoc balance will result in invalidation. At the same time, political parties’
First Amendment right to retain their ideological commitments,
without fear of viewpoint discrimination, would be preserved. As
the Founding Fathers certainly understood, democracy demands
freedom, but such freedom must be structured by rules. Freedom
without rules would result in anarchy; rules without freedom, tyranny. The public forum doctrine provides the right balance.

